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WHY THE SKY DIDN'T FALL: USING
JUDICIAL CREATIVITY TO CIRCUMVENT
CRA WFORD V. WASHINGTON *
I. INTRODUCTION
A woman's voice, frightened and full of panic, calls out across a
911 switchboard. Trembling, the woman pleads for help. Her
boyfriend, she tells the operator, just attacked her. At trial, the
boyfriend faces charges of domestic assault, but the victim is too
afraid to testify; the boyfriend moves to exclude as evidence the
recorded 911 call. The call, he argues, is hearsay. Accordingly, its
admission violates his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses
against him.
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Crawford v. Washington,1 the 911 call would ordinarily be admitted
into evidence as an "excited utterance," 2 provided that the evidence
established all the necessary elements of that hearsay exception.
3
Moreover, prior to Crawford, the admission of such a call did not
violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.
4
The Court's ruling in Crawford threw the admissibility of
numerous hearsay statements into considerable doubt. Although the
facts of Crawford did not involve domestic violence, the decision
fundamentally altered the structure of hearsay analysis in criminal
trials.5 Accordingly, the decision bears directly on all areas of
criminal litigation involving the admissibility of hearsay evidence.
6
* Recipient of the 2004-05 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Best
Student Article Award.
1. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2. FED. R. EViD. 803(2).
3. See, e.g., People v. Simpson, 656 N.Y.S.2d 765, 767 (App. Div. 1997)
(affirming the trial court's holding to admit the recording of a 911 call as an
excited utterance).
4. People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (Crim. Ct. 2004).
5. See id. at 876.
6. See id. at 877.
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As a result, many commentators argue that the impact of Crawford
on the criminal justice system will be monumental.7 A trend in the
lower courts that have actually applied Crawford, however, reveals
that in practice the breadth and applicability of the decision may not
be as far-reaching as initially anticipated.8
In People v. Moscat,9 a case that involved facts similar to those
presented above, the court held that a 911 call was not "testimonial"
in nature and was thus admissible under the excited utterance
exception to the hearsay rule.' 0 The court concluded that the 911 call
for help was "essentially different in nature" from the testimonial
statements that, post-Crawford, are excluded by the Confrontation
Clause."1 Moscat represents just one of the hundreds of courts
around the country grappling with the meaning and concrete
application of the new principles in the Sixth Amendment analysis
set forth in Crawford.
The Court in Crawford held that the Confrontation Clause
prohibits the admission of testimonial statements made by a witness
who fails to appear at trial unless (1) the witness is unavailable to
testify and (2) the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine the witness. 12  Crawford partially overruled the Court's
"well-settled"' 13 decision in Ohio v. Roberts,14 which allowed out-of-
court statements to be introduced at a criminal trial if the court
deemed the statements sufficiently reliable.15 Crawford substituted a
7. Both legal commentators and appellate courts have noted the
significance of the Crawford decision. See, e.g., Ira Mickenberg, 'Blakely'
and 'Crawford', NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 2004, at S8 (noting that Crawford "will
cause a sea of change in the way tens of thousands of cases are litigated"); see
also United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 838 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004) (describing
Crawford as "a case of great importance").
8. See infra Part IV.B.
9. 777 N.Y.S. 2d 875 (Crim. Ct. 2004).
10. Id. at 879-80.
11. Id. at 879.
12. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
13. State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22, 26 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
14. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
15. Id. at 66. Under Roberts, the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause
does not bar the admission of an unavailable witness' statement against a
criminal defendant if the statement "bears adequate 'indicia of reliability."' Id.
To meet the Roberts test, evidence must either fall within a "firmly rooted
hearsay exception" or bear "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Id.
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bright line rule against the admission of out-of-court testimonial
statements that were not subject to prior cross-examination. 16 Thus,
after Crawford, the only means of proving the reliability of a
testimonial 17 hearsay statement in a criminal trial is through cross-
examination of the declarant. I8  In effect, Crawford created
"significant new limitations" on the type testimony admissible
against criminal defendants.19
Although Crawford altered the analysis concerning the
admissibility of hearsay evidence by redefining the relationship
between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule, the
decision's "enhanced Confrontation Clause protection" 20 applies
only to testimonial statements. Thus, the analysis turns on the
definition of "testimonial." The Court, however, expressly declined
to provide a concrete definition of the term, leaving "for another day
any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial. ,,
22
As a result, the Court left critical concepts in the analysis undefined.
The new standard enunciated in Crawford has already begun to
materially alter the presentation of hearsay evidence in criminal
trials. The prosecution will no longer be allowed to use prior
statements of witnesses who do not testify at trial, unless the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
23
Yet due to the Court's failure to delineate a more complete definition
of testimonial, the full, long-term import of the decision is unknown.
The state and lower federal courts' interpretation of the decision will
determine the reach of the ruling.
This Note argues that the Court's new Confrontation Clause
analysis reaffirms the fundamental right of confrontation that Roberts
failed to secure. In practice, however, the decision could reach
For further discussion of Roberts, see infra Part III.C.
16. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
17. See discussion accompanying notes 122-128.
18. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
19. Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Bars Out-of-Court 'Testimonial'
Statements, TRIAL, July 2004, at 82, 85.
20. Gerald F. Uelmen, Preserving Crawford Objections, CHAMPION, July
2004, at 46.
21. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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beyond the concerns of the Sixth Amendment and thus subject
certain forms of hearsay to unwarranted constitutional scrutiny,
risking the unnecessary exclusion of valuable evidence.
Accordingly, this Note suggests that Crawford must be confined to
its proper realm: protection of a defendant's right with respect to
testimonial statements. To preserve Crawford's restoration of the
basic Sixth Amendment principles, a per se rule cannot be applied to
determine whether a particular statement is testimonial. Rather, the
critical question of what constitutes a testimonial statement must be
determined by examining the facts surrounding the proffered
statement in each particular case.
Part II of this Note summarizes the facts of Crawford and
provides an overview of commentary arising from the Court's
opinion. Part III explains the significance of hearsay with respect to
the Confrontation Clause. Additionally, Part III.C traces the
procedural history leading to the Supreme Court's decision in
Crawford, noting the Court's progression in Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence. Part IV raises the critical questions left unanswered
by the Court after Crawford. Further, Part IV.B examines a trend in
how the lower federal and state courts have interpreted Crawford as
applied to specific factual scenarios in various areas of litigation.
This section argues that although Crawford fundamentally changed
the structure of the hearsay analysis, an assessment of the lower
courts' interpretation of testimonial reveals that in practice, the scope
of the decision might not be as expansive as anticipated. 24 Part V
recommends that due to the potential implications of applying
Crawford to statements beyond the concern of the Sixth Amendment,
lower courts must cautiously consider the application of Crawford on
a case-by-case basis.
II. A SHIFT IN THE LAW WITH; A LACK OF GUIDANCE
In Crawford v. Washington,25 the United States Supreme Court
received an opportunity to reconsider the relationship between the
Confrontation Clause and the admissibility of hearsay evidence. The
Court reassessed the history, text, and policy underlying the
24. See infra Part IV.B.
25. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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confrontation right, holding that "[w]here testimonial statements are
at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually
prescribes: confrontation.
'" 26
A. Crawford v. Washington: Facts of the Case
A jury convicted Michael Crawford of attempted murder and
assault for stabbing a man who allegedly attempted to rape his wife,
Sylvia. 27  At trial, Crawford claimed self-defense. 28  Both the
defendant and his wife provided separate recorded statements to the
police. Sylvia's statement arguably contradicted her husband's claim
of self-defense. 29 "Sylvia did not testify because of the state marital
privilege, which generally bars a spouse from testifying without the
other spouse's consent."3°  Rather, the State played for the jury
Sylvia's tape-recorded statement to the police describing the
stabbing.3' At issue was whether the admission of the statement
complied with the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.
32
The trial court admitted the statement based on the test set forth
in Roberts, and offered several reasons to support the trustworthiness
of the statement: Sylvia was not shifting blame but rather
corroborating her husband's story that he acted in self-defense; she
had direct knowledge as an eyewitness; she was describing recent
events; and she was questioned by a "neutral" law enforcement
officer.3 3 While the Washington Court of Appeals reversed, the
Washington Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, unanimously
concluding that although the statement did not fall under a firmly
rooted hearsay exception, it bore guarantees of trustworthiness.
34
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction,
26. Id. at 69.
27. Id. at 38.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060 (1) (1994).
31. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
32. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38-40.
34. Id. at 40.
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stating that prior case law erroneously permitted the admission of the
wife's recorded statement based on "amorphous notions of
'reliability' without considering the constitutional requirement that
testimony against an accused be subject to cross-examination. 35 The
Court held that the Sixth Amendment "commands, not that evidence
be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by
testing in the crucible of cross-examination." 36  Thus, the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause bars the use of a testimonial
statement made by a witness who fails to appear at a criminal trial,
unless the witness is unavailable to testify at trial and was subject to
cross-examination at the time the declarant made the statement.
37
The Court concluded that the wife's statement, made during a police
investigation, was testimonial in nature, and the defendant had no
prior opportunity for cross-examination. 38 Accordingly, the Court
excluded the statement.
39
In reaching its decision, the Court turned to the historical
background of the Confrontation Clause.40 The Court found that the
history supported two inferences concerning the Sixth Amendment.
4 1
First, "the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and
particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused."42 Second, "the Framers would not have allowed admission
of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial
unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a
prior opportunity for cross-examination. ' 43  Accordingly, a prior
opportunity to cross-examine was a necessary, not merely a
sufficient, condition for the admissibility of testimonial statements of
an unavailable declarant against the accused in a criminal case.
44
35. Id. at 61.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 53-54.
38. Id. at 68.
39. See id. at 69 (reversing the state supreme court's decision to admit the
wife's statement against the defendant).
40. Id. at 42.
41. Id. at 49-50.
42. Id. at 50.
43. Id. at 53-54.
44. Id. at 54.
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The Court described the standard previously set forth in Roberts
as "malleable" and "subjective, ' '45 noting that "[t]he Roberts test
allows a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary process,
based on a mere judicial determination of reliability.' '46  The
Confrontation Clause requires reliable evidence, but reliability can
only be assessed through cross-examination. 47 Thus, according to
the Court, Roberts obscured the principles underlying the Clause.
48
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor concurred in the judgment but
dissented from the decision to overrule Roberts, stating that the
Crawford decision complicated rather than clarified the rules.
4 9
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the lack of guidance in how
to apply the Court's new analysis, stating that "the thousands of
federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state prosecutors
need answers... [t]hey need them now, not months or years from
now... parties should not be left in the dark in this manner."
50
Thus, although all nine justices voted to overturn Crawford's
conviction, the majority's ruling failed to provide a definitive
structure that would reconcile the hearsay exceptions with the
demands of the Confrontation Clause.
B. "A Legal Landmark: -51 Commentary on Crawford
The moment the United States Supreme Court handed down the
Crawford opinion, legal commentators declared the decision to be
the "blockbuster criminal ruling of the year"52 and a "legal landmark
on the right to confront one's accuser."5 3 Crawford established a
new standard for the admissibility of hearsay in criminal trials that
departed from over twenty years of precedent. 54 Accordingly, many
45. Id. at 60, 63.
46. Id. at 62.
47. Id.
48. See id..
49. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment but dissenting
from the Court's decision to overrule Roberts).
50. Id. at 75-76.
51. Robin Franzen, Lawyer's Logic, Skills Sway Justices, THE OREGONIAN,
July 6, 2004, at AO 1.
52. Uelmen, supra note 20, at 46.
53. Franzen, supra note 51, at A01.
54. See Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 68-69 (abrogating Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56 (1980)).
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commentators noted that the ruling "change[d] the law of evidence
followed by every criminal court in the United States" 55 and
anticipated that the decision would cause "rapid and profound
changes in how hearsay statements are used against a defendant in a
criminal trial."56
In many respects, the "importance of Crawford cannot be
overstated" 57 as the decision "calls into question the continued
vitality of virtually all the exceptions to the hearsay rule that have
become part of the legal landscape over several decades."
58
Specifically, commentators expect Crawford to have a significant
impact on the admissibility of hearsay evidence in domestic violence
and child abuse cases. 59 For instance, in domestic violence cases,
prosecutors are frequently faced with victims who recant their
testimony, fail to show up for trial, or refuse to take the stand.6°
Prior to Crawford, out-of-court statements that met hearsay
exceptions constituted a significant form of evidence prosecutors
used to prove their cases. 6 1  Accordingly, prosecutors fashioned
"victimless" prosecutions. In other words, the government
attempted to prove the defendant's guilt without testimony from the
55. Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 82.
56. Rene L. Valladares & Franny A. Forsman, Crawford v. Washington:
The Confrontation Clause Gets Teeth, NEV. LAW., Sept. 2004, at 12, 12.
57. Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 85.
58. Mickenberg, supra note 7, at S8. For example, statements made during
grand jury proceedings can no longer be admitted against a criminal defendant
unless the defendant is afforded the opportunity to confront the accuser.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
59. See Sherrie Bourg Carter & Bruce M. Lyons, The Potential Impact of
Crawford v. Washington on Child Abuse, Elderly Abuse and Domestic
Violence Litigation, CHAMPION, Oct. 2004, at 21, 22. Criminal litigation
involving child abuse, elderly abuse and domestic violence share several
common characteristics. Id. at 21. Generally, the only witnesses in these cases
are the alleged victims and the professionals who interviewed them after the
alleged crime. Id. Additionally, these cases often involve witnesses who are
unavailable to testify at trial for a number of reasons. Id.
60. See, e.g., People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (Crim. Ct. 2004)
(stating that "some complainants in domestic assault cases are unwilling to
testify at trial because they fear the defendant, because they are economically
or emotionally dependent upon the defendant").
61. See Carter & Lyons, supra note 59, at 22.
62. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
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complainant by using other evidence that fell within certain
exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as statements made by a victim
to doctors at the hospital, as statements made for the purpose of
seeking medical treatment,63 or statements by the victim to police
officers arriving at the scene as "excited utterances." 64  Such
statements are now inadmissible if testimonial.
65
Additionally, commentators anticipate Crawford's impact to be
especially strong in child abuse cases. 66 In such cases, the state often
calls as witnesses the adults who claim the child told them about the
abuse but does not call the child as a witness. 67 After Crawford,
most of the adults' hearsay testimony may be inadmissible unless the
defense is able to cross-examine the accuser. 68  Whether such
statements are admissible depends on how the courts apply the term
"testimonial" to statements made to examining doctors,
schoolteachers, family members, social workers, and police officers
responding to suspicion of abuse.
6 9
While Crawford's impact is apparent and substantial in certain
areas, the Court left critical questions unanswered. Thus, while the
potential impact of Crawford is monumental, in many respects the
ultimate effect of the decision is "unknown and unpredictable., 70 As
a result, in practice, lower courts' interpretation of the opinion will
63. See FED. R. EvID. 803(4), (6); see also People v. Swinger, 689
N.Y.S.2d 336, 349 (Crim. Ct. 1998) (holding that statements made by the
complainant to a hospital doctor were made for the purposes of treatment and
thereby admissible as "business records").
64. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 878; see FED. R. EvID. 803(2); see also People
v. Fratello, 92 N.Y.2d 565, 570-71 (Ct. App. 1998) (statements by victim to
first officers at the scene are admissible as excited utterances).
65. Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and
Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 511, 513 (2005).
Mosteller notes that after Crawford certain "[i]nvestigative and prosecutorial
practices are certain to change." Id. For example, practices of videotaping
victims' statements to investigating officers shortly after the alleged crime
were once extremely "useful to the prosecution, but now produce inadmissible
testimonial statements." Id. at 513.
66. See, e.g., Peter Adomeit, Raleigh's Revenge: Crawford v. Washington,
W. MAss. L. TRIB., Oct. 17, 2004, at 4.
67. See Mickenberg, supra note 7, at 8.
68. Id.
69. See Mosteller, supra note 65, at 518.
70. Id. at 512.
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determine the actual impact of Crawford.
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The interplay between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay
rule in criminal litigation 7 1 is critical to understanding the
implications of Crawford. Additionally, the procedural history of
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence provides insight into how the
Court arrived at its decision.
The admission of hearsay evidence against a criminal defendant
implicates the Sixth Amendment because the court does not afford
the defendant the opportunity to confront the out-of-court
declarant.72 Although the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause
were generally designed to protect similar values, the two claims are
distinct.73  For instance, the Confrontation Clause may bar the
admission of some evidence that would otherwise be admissible
under an exception to the hearsay rule.
74
A. Hearsay
As a matter of both federal and state law, hearsay is generally
inadmissible unless the statement falls within an exception to the
hearsay rule.75 Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines
7 1. The impact of the hearsay rule differs between civil and criminal cases.
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 5 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 802.05(1) (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2004). The
difference results, in part, from the applicability of the Sixth Amendment in
criminal cases. Id. at § 802.05(1)(b).
72. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980); California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970).
73. See, e.g., Green, 399 U.S. at 155 (noting that the values protected under
the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause are similar but do not
completely overlap).
74. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 ("[t]he historical evidence leaves little doubt...
that the Clause was intended to exclude some hearsay [evidence]"); see, e.g.,
Barber v. Paige, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (holding that admitting former testimony
of the codefendant would violate the Confrontation Clause when the state
made no effort to produce a witness).
75. See FED. R. EvID. 802; 1 B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 1, at
679-80 (4th ed. 2000) ("Hearsay evidence is evidence of a statement made out
of court and offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. Unless it comes
within one of the established exceptions to the hearsay rule, evidence of this
type is inadmissible."). Although this Note predominately cites to the Federal
1844
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hearsay as "a statement,76 other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted. 77  Hearsay statements are generally
inadmissible at trial due to their lack of reliability because the
statements are not made under oath and the adverse party has no
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. 78 Moreover, the judge
and jury do not have an opportunity to evaluate a witness'
"perception, memory, and narration" in the courtroom. 79
Even when an out-of-court statement is offered for the truth of
the matter asserted, the statement may nonetheless be admissible as
either an exception or an exemption to the hearsay rule. 80  The
Federal Rules of Evidence enumerate nearly thirty types of
admissible hearsay evidence that have developed over three
centuries.81
B. The Confrontation Clause
The Confrontation Clause guarantees the right of the accused to
confront hostile witnesses and, thus, protects the right of cross-
examination.82 Defendants possess the right to test the credibility of
Rules of Evidence, most states have enacted similar evidentiary rules modeled
after the federal rules. See, e.g., CAL. EvID. CODE § 1200 (Deering 2004).
76. Rule 801(a) defines a "statement" as "(1) an oral or written assertion or
(2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person to be an
assertion." FED. R. EvID. 801(a).
77. FED R. EvID. 801(c).
78. 1 WITKIN, supra note 75; see also Glen Weissenberger, Hearsay
Puzzles: An Essay on Federal Evidence Rule 803(3), 64 TEMP. L. REV. 145
(1991) (stating that hearsay is "inherently unreliable" and "presumptively
untrustworthy because the out-of-court declarant cannot be cross-examined
immediately as to any inaccuracy or ambiguity in his or her statement").
79. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 71, at § 802.02; See also California
v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (stating that the ability to cross-examine a
witness is the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth").
80. For exemptions (i.e., statements defined as "not hearsay"), see FED. R.
EvID. 801(d). For exceptions, see FED. R. EvID. 803.
81. Co-conspirator statements are one example of an exemption to the
hearsay rule. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). Examples of exceptions to the
hearsay rule include business records, statements made for the purposes of
medical diagnosis and treatment, excited utterances, statements regarding the
declarant's state of mind, past record recollections, dying declarations, and
statements against penal interest. FED. R. EVID. 803(2)-(6), 804(b)(2)-(3).
82. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63
1845Summer 2005]
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their accusers in order to prevent ex parte (outside of court) hearsay
statements.8 3  The confrontation right is designed to enhance the
truth-finding function of trial through face-to-face confrontation
during the witness's direct testimony and through the opportunity for
confrontation by cross-examination. 84  Thus, the Confrontation
Clause increases the likelihood that an accusation by an adverse
witness is truthful by requiring the witness to confront the accused.8 5
Additionally, the Clause promotes truthfulness by forcing the witness
to make accusations under oath.86 The means of testing accuracy are
so important that "the absence of proper confrontation at trial 'calls
into question the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process.'
87
The express language of the Confrontation Clause provides that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him."88  A literal
interpretation of the clause would bar all hearsay, even if the
statement fell within an exception.89 Although the Supreme Court
has repeatedly reaffirmed defendants' confrontation rights, 90 the
Court has never considered cross-examination at trial an absolute
right.91 The Court has also indicated that the admission of hearsay
(1980) (emphasizing that the primary interest secured by the Confrontation
Clause is right of cross-examination).
83. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1920); Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
84. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63; Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46
(1990).
85. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43 (noting that confrontation rights allow
the accused to test the demeanor and credibility of an adverse witness).
86. See Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (stating that requiring a witness to make an
accusation under oath is helpful in "impressing [the witness] with the
seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a
penalty for perjury").
87. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284, 295 (1973)).
88. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
89. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
90. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965) ("[t]here are few
subjects.., upon which this Court and other courts have been more nearly
unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and
cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of
fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal.").
91. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346-47 (1970) (holding that the
right of confrontation is not absolute). A defendant can waive his or her right
1846
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evidence does not automatically violate the defendant's right to
confront an adverse witness.
92
C. Influential Case Law Before Crawford
One of the most influential cases in modem Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence connecting the Confrontation Clause and the
hearsay rule is Ohio v. Roberts.93 In Roberts, the Supreme Court
discussed the interplay between the hearsay rule and the
Confrontation Clause in an effort to clarify the standards for
determining when hearsay evidence can be admitted without
offending a defendant's confrontation right. The defendant in
Roberts was charged with check forgery and possession of stolen
credit cards. 94 At a preliminary hearing, the defense counsel called
Anita Isaacs, the daughter of the man whose checks and credit cards
the defendant allegedly stole. 95 Defense counsel attempted to have
Isaacs admit that she gave the defendant her parents' checks and
credit cards without informing him that she lacked her parents'
permission to do SO. 9 6 The daughter denied giving Roberts the check
and credit cards. 9 7  A county grand jury subsequently indicted
Roberts for forgery and for receiving stolen property.
9 8
At trial, the prosecution relied on an Ohio statute99 to introduce a
transcript of the testimony elicited at Robert's preliminary hearing
from the daughter who had since become unavailable. 100 At issue
to cross-examination by either failing to make a timely objection or by
preventing a witness from testifying. See, e.g., United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d
785, 814-15 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant waives his confrontation
right when defendant procures the witness' silence through actual violence or
murder).
92. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (allowing the admission
of co-conspirator's spontaneous out-of-court statements that were against his
penal interest because they fell within an exception to the hearsay rule).
93. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
94. Id. at 58.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 (West 1975) permits the use of
preliminary examination testimony of a witness who "cannot for any reason be
produced at the trial."
100. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59.
1847Summer 2005]
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was whether the Confrontation Clause barred the admission of an
absent declarant's preliminary hearing testimony.101 The U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the testimony was admissible under the
Confrontation Clause, holding that the Sixth Amendment permitted
the previous testimony of an unavailable witness when the testimony
had been subjected to the equivalent of cross-examination at the
preliminary hearing. 102
With regard to the former testimony exception to the hearsay
rule, the Court noted two ways in which the Confrontation Clause
limits the admissibility of hearsay evidence. 10 3 First, the clause
establishes an unavailability requirement. 104 In other words, "[i]n the
usual case ... the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate
the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use
against the defendant."' 1 5 Second, to increase accuracy in the fact-
finding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test
adverse evidence, the hearsay must be marked with adequate "indicia
of reliability" when the witness is shown to be unavailable.l°6 The
reliability prong of the Roberts test is satisfied if the evidence "falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."' 1 7 Yet if the evidence
does not come under a firmly rooted exception, the proponent must
show "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" to avoid the
exclusion of the evidence.'
0 8
Although Roberts provided general guidelines for determining
the admissibility of hearsay statements under the Confrontation
Clause, the Court's failure to specifically define the breadth of the
phrase "firmly rooted hearsay exception" caused confusion and
uncertainty in the lower courts. As a result, the Supreme Court
continued to reevaluate the relationship between the Confrontation
Clause and the hearsay rule in a series of decisions following
Roberts.
In 1986, the Court clarified the scope of Roberts in United States
101. See id. at 62.
102. See id. at 75.
103. Id. at 65.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 65-66 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)).
107. Id. at 66.
108. Id.
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v. Inadi.109 There, the Court held that despite the language in
Roberts concerning the necessity of producing an available declarant,
statements of co-conspirators may be admissible even when the
declarant is available but not produced."10 The Court stated that the
unavailability requirement in Roberts could not "fairly be read to
stand for the proposition.., that no out-of-court statement can be
introduced by the government without a showing that the declarant is
unavailable.""'I I The Court clarified that the unavailability
requirement in Roberts applied only when the challenged statement
was prior testimony (as was the case in Roberts)." 
2
Six years later, in White v. Illinois," 1 3 the United States Supreme
Court extended the reasoning of Inadi to excited utterances and
statements made while receiving medical care."14 In effect, the Court
seemed to limit Roberts solely to former testimony situations, stating
that the "unavailability" requirement "stands for the proposition that
unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation
Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements
were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.""' 5  The
Court stated that "there is little benefit, if any, to be accomplished by
imposing an 'unavailability rule.""'16 Thus, the Court reasoned that
proving a declarant's unavailability would not substantially add to
the fact-finding process or the accuracy of the statements.
11 7
The Court once again considered the relationship between the
Confrontation Clause and hearsay evidence in Lilly v. Virginia. 118 At
109. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
110. Id. at 394-95. The Court reasoned that in the context of co-conspirator
statements, an out-of-court statement is more reliable evidence than the
declarant's in-court testimony. Id. at 395. According to the Court, the
"statements provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that cannot be
replicated" because "[cionspirators are likely to speak differently when talking
to each other in furtherance of their illegal aims than when testifying on the
witness stand." Id.
111. Id. at 394.
112. Id.
113. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
114. Id. at 348-49.
115. Id. at 354.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 354-55.
118. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
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issue in Lilly was whether the admission into evidence of the non-
testifying accomplice's entire confession, which contained some
statements against the accomplice's penal interest and other
statements that inculpated the accused, violated the "accused's Sixth
Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.""19  The Court held that the admission of the confession
violated Lilly's confrontation rights. 120  The plurality opinion,
written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Souter, Ginsberg,
and Breyer, concluded that the "[declaration] against penal interest"
exception is not a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception as defined by
the Confrontation Clause.
121
The decision in Lilly narrowed the admissibility of accomplice's
statements to situations in which their trustworthiness could be
established. 122 More importantly, the impact of Lilly "further
solidifie[d] the defendant's necessity to confront the witness in
situations where veracity may be questionable."' 123  The Lilly
decision created a "resurgence in the utility of the confrontation
clause."' 24  Further, in a separate concurring opinion, Justices
Breyer, Scalia, and Thomas indicated their readiness to move beyond
the Roberts framework and to consider an approach that focused on
whether the challenged hearsay resembles the old ex parte affidavits
against which the Confrontation Clause originally guarded.'
25
Despite the plurality's decision in Lilly and the Court's
speculation that it was "highly unlikely"'126 that accomplice
confessions implicating the accused could survive Roberts,127 courts
continued to admit such statements.' 28 The Court in Crawford noted
119. Id. at 124.
120. Id. at 139.
121. Id. at 133.
122. See Leslie Morsek, Lilly v. Virginia: Silencing the "Firmly Rooted"
Hearsay Exception with Regard to an Accomplice's Testimony and Its
Rejuvenation of the Confrontation Clause, 33 AKRON L. REv. 523, 544 (2000).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 547.
125. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 141-42 (Breyer, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 137.
127. See id.
128. See, e.g., Roger W. Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the Confrontation
Questions in Lilly v. Virginia, 53 SYRACUSE L. REv. 87, 105 (2003)
(discussing a study that found, after Lilly, appellate courts admitted accomplice
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that notwithstanding Lilly, lower courts have invoked Roberts to
admit other sorts of plainly testimonial statements despite the
opportunity for cross-examination.1 2 9 Perhaps if the lower courts had
taken heed after Lilly, the Court may have never issued Crawford.
The courts, however did not take heed and, thus, the willingness of
three Justices in Lilly to abandon the Roberts framework and the
subsequent failure of courts to follow the Lilly decision ultimately set
the stage for Crawford.
Although pre-Crawford the Court had been "careful not to
equate"'130 the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule, the Court's
rulings arguably endorsed a view that recognized "the similarity, if
not [the] equivalency," of the Clause and the hearsay rule. 3' Under
the doctrine that evolved after Roberts, admitting hearsay evidence
did not offend the Confrontation Clause if the prosecution could
prove that the evidence fell within a firmly rooted exception to the
hearsay rule or possessed particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness. Thus, Crawford imposed a radically new structure
for analyzing hearsay statements in a criminal case.
IV. AVOIDING THE CRA WFORD TRAP
After Crawford, the proper determination of whether an out-of-
court statement is admissible against a criminal defendant no longer
turns on whether the statement falls within a recognized exception to
the hearsay rule. Instead, if the declarant made an out-of-court
statement and the defendant did not have an opportunity for cross-
examination, the statement must be excluded if testimonial.132
statements to the authorities in twenty-five out of seventy cases-more than
one-third of the time).
129. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 64 (citing United States v.
Aguilar, 295 F.3d 1018, 1021-1023 (9th Cir. 2002)).
130. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990).
131. Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV.
557, 592-93 (1992).
132. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
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A. "Testimonial" Undefined
Although the Court expressly declined to define testimonial,
133
the Court's opinion did provide some guidance in determining what
types of statements the term may encompass. The Court generally
defined testimonial statements as "extrajudicial statements...
contained in formalized testimonial materials," such as plea
allocutions; prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury, at a former trial, or at a deposition; statements made in an
affidavit; confessions to the police; and responses to police
interrogations. 34 Further, an out-of-court statement taken by a law
enforcement officer constitutes a testimonial statement if the
declarant made the statement under circumstances that would "lead
an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would
be available for use at a later trial."' 135 The Court, however, noted
that "not all hearsay implicates the Sixth Amendment's core
concerns. An off-hand remark might be unreliable evidence and thus
a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little
resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause
targeted."1
36
While the common factor underlying the Court's discussion of
what constitutes a testimonial statement appears to be the official or
formal quality of such a statement, the limits of the term are
unknown. Moreover, the Court did not state which characteristics
might determine whether a given statement constitutes testimony.
After Crawford, some of the most controversial areas of litigation
include the admissibility of 911 calls, 137 excited utterances to police
officers, 138 statements made to family and friends, 139 domestic
133. Id. at 50-52.
134. See id. at 51-52. As noted by the Court, "interrogation" is meant in a
"colloquial, rather than any technical legal, sense." Id. at 53 n.4.
135. Id. at 1352 (citing Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers et al., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-94 10)).
136. Id.
137. See discussion supra accompanying notes 9-11, 244-256.
138. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Arave, 371 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2004) (questioning
whether victim's excited utterances while seeking police assistance were
testimonial under Crawford); State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004) (questioning whether Crawford barred excited utterances to law
enforcement officers immediately after the victim of a traumatic crime became
free).
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violence and child abuse cases, 140 police field investigations,14 1 and
the admissibility of affidavits and reports. 1
42
B. Applying Crawford
According to legal commentators and appellate courts, Crawford
will cause a "sea change"'143 or a "paradigm shift"' 44 in the
admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal trials. While Crawford
significantly altered the structure of the hearsay analysis, the Court's
opinion required that lower courts apply their own interpretation of
"testimonial."' 145  Accordingly, the exact parameters of what
constitutes a testimonial statement under Crawford are not readily
apparent, and many cases reflect a tendency to apply a narrower
definition of the term. 146 As a result, the following review of the
lower court cases questioning the application of Crawford reveals
that the courts have discovered ways to circumvent the decision.
This section will identify the significant trends and examine the
analysis in the lower court decisions that have distinguished
139. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 374 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2004)
(questioning whether the nontestifying codefendant's statements to his
relatives were admissible under Crawford); United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR
137-1, 2004 WL 1631675 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2004) (questioning whether
statements to family members were testimonial).
140. See, e.z., People v. Vigil, No. 02CA0833, 2004 WL 1352647 (Colo. Ct.
App. June 17, 2004) (questioning whether Crawford prohibited videotaped
statements of a child victim); Snowden v. Maryland, 846 A.2d 36 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2004) (questioning whether a social worker's hearsay statements
could be admitted to replace the testimony of a child witness without violating
the Confrontation Clause); People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. Ct. App.
2004) (questioning whether the introduction of victim-child's statement to
Children Assessment Center's executive director violated Crawford).
141. See, e.g., People v. Newland, 775 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Sup. Ct. 2004)
(determining whether Crawford barred the introduction of brief, informal
remarks made to an officer while he conducted a field investigation).
142. See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 812 N.E.2d 516 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
(examining whether the introduction of victim's affidavit in support of a
restraining order violates Crawford if the victim does not testify at trial); City
of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 91 P.3d 591 (Nev. 2004) (determining whether the
admission of a health professional's affidavit prepared for the prosecution to
use in a DUI trial violated Crawford).
143. Mickenberg, supra note 7, at S8.
144. People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 851 (Ct. App. 2004).
145. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
146. See supra discussion accompanying notes 138-142.
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Crawford.
1. State Cases
Many state courts have adopted a loose "totality of the
circumstances" test to determine whether a statement is testimonial.
Two key elements in the decision are whether the declarant made the
statement in response to structured questioning by a government
official and whether the declarant would reasonably expect his or her
statement to be used at trial.
a. State v. Forrest
In State v. Forrest,147 the court considered whether Crawford
barred excited utterances to law enforcement officers immediately
after the victim of a traumatic crime became free from her captor.'
48
Willie Forrest III was convicted of first-degree kidnapping, assault
with a deadly weapon, and assault upon a law enforcement officer. 1
49
Law enforcement officers rescued Cynthia Moore from the defendant
who had kidnapped her.' 50  At the time of her rescue, she was
"shaking, crying, and very nervous."15 1 Immediately thereafter, she
told the detective what the defendant had done to her. 152 Moore did
not testify at trial, and the state sought to introduce her statements to
the detective. 153  At issue was whether these statements were
testimonial. 
54
The court held that the statements were not testimonial and
admitted them pursuant to the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule. 155 The court found that the facts in the present case
were analogous to a 911 call situation. "Just as with a 911 call, a
spontaneous statement made to police immediately after a rescue can
be considered 'part of the criminal incident itself, rather than as part
147. 596 S.E.2d 22 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
148. Id. at 24.
149. Id. at 23.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 24.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 26.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 27-28.
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of the prosecution that follows." ' 156 Further, the court noted that the
police do not typically initiate a "spontaneous statement made
immediately after a rescue from a kidnapping at knife point."'157 The
victim made the statements to the police immediately following the
incident; it was not a "formal statement, deposition, or affidavit."'
158
She was not aware that she was "bearing witness" or that "her
utterances might impact further legal proceedings."'
159
The court in Forrest first looked to the Supreme Court's opinion
in Crawford.160 Since the Court declined to define "testimonial," the
Forrest court relied on Moscat, "one of the first cases to interpret
Crawford."'16 1 The Forrest court then applied the facts of the case to
determine whether the statements at issue fit within the Moscat
court's analysis. 162 Holding that the proffered statements were not
testimonial, the court in Forrest distinguished Crawford and declined
to apply an expansive definition of "testimonial."'
' 63
Further, after the court determined the statement was not
testimonial, the court proceeded to consider whether the statements
"fit within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule."' 164 The
court's use of the traditional hearsay analysis suggests that even after
Crawford, the Confrontation Clause does not impose any restrictions
on hearsay that is non-testimonial in nature.
b. State of Maine v. Barnes
The Court in Barnes165 addressed the issue of whether a
mother's statements to the police were testimonial in nature.
166
Barnes was charged with the murder of his mother. 167 Before trial,
Barnes moved in limine to exclude testimony including his prior
156. Id. at 27 (quoting People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880 (Crim. Ct.
2004)).
157. Id. (citing Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 880).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 26.
162. Id. at 26-27.
163. Id. at27.
164. Id. at28.
165. 854 A.2d 208 (Me. 2004).
166. Id. at211.
167. Id. at209.
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statements that he wanted to kill his mother.' 68 The court denied his
motion. 169 "In addition to other evidence of prior threats, the jury
heard the testimony of a police officer."'170 The officer testified that
Barnes' mother drove herself to the police station more than a year
before the murder and came into the station crying. 171 "[S]he said
that her son had assaulted her and had threatened to kill her more
than once during the day."' 172 The court admitted this testimony
pursuant to the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, and
the jury convicted Barnes. 173 At issue on appeal was whether the
mother's statements to the police when she reported the crimes were
testimonial in nature.174
Under Crawford, the Maine Supreme Court held that the
mother's statements were not testimonial in nature and thus their
admission did not violate the defendant's confrontation rights.
75
The court looked to a number of factors in reaching its decision.
176
First, the police "did not seek [the mother] out. ' 177 Rather, the
mother went to the police on her own resolve.' 78 Second, the mother
made the statements while she was still under the stress of the
incident. 179 As a result, any questions posed to her by the police
were asked to determine the cause of her distress. 80 Third, she did
not respond to tactically structured police questioning, but instead
sought help from the police.'1
8
Similar to Forrest, the court in Barnes refrained from
articulating a per se definition of "testimonial." Rather, the court
considered whether the statement at issue constituted the type of
statement specifically referred to in Crawford, stating that the
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at211.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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"appropriate application of the principles expressed in Crawford,
will require detailed attention to the specific facts in each case."
1 82
The above cases are representative of the numerous instances in
which state courts have distinguished Crawford based on a narrow
definition of "testimonial." While the Court in Crawford left the
definition open to a broad interpretation, many lower courts have
limited it to those statements that lie at the "core" of Sixth
Amendment concerns. 
8 3
When applicable, Crawford has greatly affected the
182. Id. at 212.
183. See People v. Griffin, 93 P.3d 344 (Cal. 2004) (holding that a statement
made by the victim to a friend at school is not testimonial under Crawford);
People v. Johnson, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the use
of hearsay laboratory report at probation revocation hearing did not violate
Crawford); People v. Cervantes, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774, (Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that an out-of-court statement made to others for the purpose of
seeking medical attention does not violate Crawford if the declarant expected
the statement would be related to the police, but did not reasonably expect it
would be used at a later trial); People v. Edwards, 101 P.3d 1118 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2004) (holding that excited utterances by victim are admissible
notwithstanding Crawford); State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191 (Conn. 2004)
(holding that co-conspirator statements are not covered by Crawford);
Somervell v. State, 883 So.2d 836, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that
statements made by an autistic child to his mother are not testimonial); Blanton
v. Fla., 880 So.2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the opportunity
to depose the victim satisfies Crawford); In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2004) (holding that all statements by a child victim to a social worker or
treating doctor are not per se testimonial); Kansas v. Young, 87 P.3d 308 (Kan.
2004) (holding that the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the
preliminary hearing satisfies Crawford); People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004) (stating in dicta that the introduction of child-victim's
statement to Children's Assessment Center's executive director did not violate
Crawford because the director was not a government employee); State v.
Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 2004) (holding that statements made by victim
to a physician for purposes of medical treatment are not testimonial under
Crawford because the parents took the child to the doctor for medical
treatment, not to prepare testimony for trial); People v. Newland, 775 N.Y.S.2d
308, 309 (App. Div. 2004) (holding that Crawford does not bar the
introduction of brief, informal remarks made to an officer while he was
conducting a field investigation when those remarks were not made in response
to "structured police questioning"); Cassidy v. Texas, 149 S.W.3d 712 (Tex.
Ct. App. 2004) (holding that Crawford does not bar excited utterances during a
police interview at the hospital where the victim is being treated for severe
injuries); State v. Orndorff, 95 P.3d 406 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a
911 call is admissible under Crawford).
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admissibility of hearsay by excluding evidence previously admissible
under Roberts. For instance, in City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 184 the
court held that the admission of a health professional's affidavit
prepared for the prosecution to use in a DUI trial violated
Crawford.1'5  Additionally, in State v. Courtney,186 the court held
that statements made to a child-protection worker in preparation for
trial were inadmissible.' 87 In both cases, the prosecution prepared
the evidence specifically for use at trial. As a result, the statements
were inadmissible after Crawford.
88
Yet in cases where the formal nature of the statement is less
clear, lower court decisions reflect a tendency to interpret Crawford
narrowly and consider the admissibility of non-testimonial
statements under the traditional hearsay analysis.
2. Federal Cases
Similar to many of the state courts, numerous federal courts
have discovered ways to circumvent the Crawford decision by
interpreting "testimonial" narrowly and finding that a proffered
statement falls within any of the limited number of examples set
forth by the Court in Crawford.
a. Leavitt v. Arave
In Leavitt,189 the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether a
victim's excited utterances to the police were testimonial under
Crawford 90 In Leavitt, the victim became frightened by a prowler
184. 91 P.3d 591 (Nev. 2004).
185. Id. at 595.
186. 682 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
187. Id. at 205.
188. See People v. Pirwani, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding
that CAL. EvID. CODE § 1380 (Deering 2004), which permitted the introduction
of elderly or dependent adults' videotaped statements to law enforcement
officials, was unconstitutional under Crawford); People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a child's statement to a police
officer at the scene of the incident was testimonial because the child was
unavailable, and the statement was "knowingly given in response to structured
police questioning").
189. 371 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2004).
190. Id. at 683.
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who tried to break into her home. 191 Under distress, she called the
police and spoke to dispatchers and to police officers.' 9 2 Among
other statements, she named Leavitt as the prowler because he had
tried to enter her house earlier that day.' 93 At issue, in part, was
whether the admission of the hearsay testimony violated Leavitt's
rights under the Confrontation Clause.1
94
The court held that the statements were not testimonial and did
not violate Leavitt's confrontation rights. 195 Among the factors the
court considered was who initiated the action.1 96 Here, the victim
sought the help of the police, and she was not interrogated by
them. 197 Thus, the court found that the statements against Leavitt did
not implicate "the principle evil at which the Confrontation Clause
was directed[:] ... the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and
particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the
accused."1
98
b. Horton v. Allen
In Horton,199 the court ruled that Crawford does not apply to
statements introduced under the state-of-mind exception to the
hearsay rule when the statements are made to a private individual.2 ° °
A jury convicted Russell Horton of committing two first-degree
murders and an assault with intent to murder. 20 ' Horton provided
inconsistent testimony concerning his whereabouts on the night of
the murders.20 2 "He first told the police that he had met up with
[Frederick] Christian, that they had gone for a walk..., and [that he]
had gone home at approximately 11 p.m." 20 3 Horton then changed
his story and stated that he and Christian were with another man,
191. Id. at 668.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 683.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 684 n.22.
198. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004)).
199. 370 F.3d 75 (1st Cir. 2004).
200. Id. at 84-85.
201. Id. at 78.
202. Id. at 79.
203. Id.
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Kepler Desir, and two others. 204  The trial court admitted Henry
Garcia's testimony that on the day of the murders, "Christian had
stated that he needed money and that Desir had refused to give him
drugs on credit."20 5  The court affirmed the admission of the
testimony under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule.
20 6
After the appeal was briefed, the Supreme Court decided
Crawford.2 °7 At issue, in part, was whether Christian's statements
qualified as testimonial.20 8 The court found the statements were not
testimonial in nature and that Crawford thus did not apply.20 9 In
reaching its decision, the court looked to the "three 'formulations of
[the] core class[es] of testimonial statements' mentioned in
Crawford.2 10 The court in Horton found that the statements admitted
at trial did not fit into these specific formulations.
2 11
Rather than applying a broad definition of "testimonial," the
courts in the above cases looked to the passages in Crawford that set
forth examples of testimonial statements. Other circuit courts have
held that testimonial statements include "prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing or other court proceeding, as well as confessions
and responses made during police interrogations." 212 For instance,
the Second Circuit has concluded that Crawford looks to the
204. Id.
205. Id. at 83.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 84.
209. Id.
210. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)). The
first "core class of 'testimonial' statements" consists of "ex parte in-court
testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits,
custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect
to be used prosecutorially." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. The second formulation
described testimonial statements as "extrajudicial statements... contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions." Id. at 52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)). Finally, the third explained that
testimonial statements are those "made under circumstances which would lead
an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial." Id. (quoting Brief for National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae 3).
211. Horton, 370 F.3d at 84.
212. United States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 221 (2d Cir. 2004).
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"reasonable expectation of the declarant, ' 213 namely, "the declarant's
awareness or expectation that his or her statements may later be used
at a trial. ' 14
3. Hybrid Approach
State courts and courts in every circuit are now being required to
interpret Crawford. At one extreme, Crawford is certain to apply
where the statement was given before a grand jury. In such cases,
the impact will certainly cause a "sea change" in the admissibility of
hearsay statements, barring previously admissible testimony. 5 At
the other extreme, a statement to a doctor for the purpose of
obtaining medical treatment is not likely to invoke Crawford.216
Most statements, however, fall in a grey area between these two
extremes.
Crawford left the definition of "testimonial" open to broad
interpretation. The opinion, however, also left room for a number of
arguments distinguishing the decision. Accordingly, many courts
that have considered cases in the grey areas of litigation have
construed the Crawford decision narrowly, focusing on the explicit
language set forth in the decision rather than applying an expansive
definition of "testimonial." 21 7
After Crawford, the issue of how to handle non-testimonial
statements remains unclear. Despite the Court's criticism of Roberts,
the Court "leaves the Roberts approach untouched with respect to
213. United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 2004).
214. Id. at 228.
215. See, e.g., United States v. Wilmore, 381 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the use of grand jury testimony to impeach a witness violated
Crawford when the witness was unavailable for cross-examination).
216. See, e.g., State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 2004) (holding that
statements made by a victim to a physician for purposes of medical treatment
are not testimonial because the statements are not prepared for the purpose of
litigation).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 362 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding
that co-conspirator statements are not testimonial); United States v. Dorman,
108 Fed. Appx. 228 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that statements of future intent are
not barred by Crawford); United States v. Taylor, 328 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D.
2004) (holding that a co-defendant's statement against interest to a fellow
criminal is admissible as a statement against interest if made in a private
setting); Hutzenlaub v. Portuondo, 325 F. Supp. 2d 236 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(holding that Crawford does not apply retroactively).
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nontestimonial statements. ' 218  Certain well-defined exceptions
remain unaffected by Crawford because exceptions such as excited
utterances, business records, and state of mind do not encompass
testimonial statements. 2 19 While the continued viability of Roberts
with respect to non-testimonial statements is uncertain,220 many
lower courts have continued to apply the Roberts reliability analysis
to non-testimonial hearsay.221 This hybrid approach (continuing to
apply the traditional hearsay analysis for non-testimonial statements
and instituting the new analysis for testimonial statements) leaves
many areas of the law unchanged. Accordingly, as applied in
practice, many statements that were previously admissible under
Roberts will remain admissible under Crawford.
V. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY IN THE WAKE OF CRA WFORD
The Crawford decision undoubtedly caused a fundamental
change in the structural analysis regarding the admissibility of
hearsay in criminal trials. Over the past two decades, courts and
legislatures have created numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule
under the reliability framework set forth in Roberts.222 As a result,
the law permitted prosecutors to introduce statements of non-
testifying witnesses made during police interrogations, grand jury
218. Saget, 377 F.3d at 227.
219. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (stating that "[m]ost of
the hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not
testimonial-for example business records or statements in furtherance of a
conspiracy"). Note, however, that Crawford could affect the admissibility of
dying declarations when such hearsay has resulted from a police interrogation.
Id. at 56 n.6.
220. The Court expressly declined to overrule White and preserved the
possibility of "an approach that exempted such [non-testimonial] statements
from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether." Id. at 68. The Court indicated
that Roberts might also be applied in this context. Id.
221. E.g., Saget, 377 F.3d at 227; see, also, People v. Moscat 777 N.Y.S.2d
875, 880 (Crim. Ct. 2004).
222. For example, California enacted a number of hearsay exceptions relying
on the Roberts "indicia of reliability" test that made clearly testimonial
statements admissible although the declarant was never subjected to cross-
examination. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360 (Deering 2004) (exception for
minors describing acts of child abuse); Id. § 1370 (exception for statements
describing the infliction of physical injury); Id. § 1380 (exception for elderly
abuse).
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proceedings, and allocutions. 223 Admitting hearsay evidence did not
offend the Confrontation Clause if the prosecution could prove that
the evidence fell within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule
or possessed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
Accordingly, many commentators argued that the doctrine that
developed after Roberts and its progeny created an inadequate
framework by simply equating the Confrontation Clause with the
hearsay analysis.
224
While both the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule
protect the right of cross-examination, 225 the confrontation right also
requires that testimony be given under oath, face-to-face with the
adverse party, and, if feasible, in open court. 226  Thus, the
Confrontation Clause provides a fundamental right that is "very
distinct in nature and consequences from ordinary hearsay
doctrine." 227 Further, the scope of the confrontation right is narrower
than the rule against hearsay, as the confrontation right only applies
to testimonial statements.
228
The Roberts analysis failed to interpret the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause in a way that secured its "intended constraint
on judicial discretion. ' 229 Instead of articulating a separate doctrine
for the confrontation right, the prior doctrine made the confrontation
right dependent on a "vague and unpredictable morass of hearsay
law.'230  Roberts failed to differentiate between testimonial
statements and other types of hearsay, thus subjecting non-
testimonial evidence to unwarranted constitutional scrutiny.23 1 The
223. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 64-65.
224. See, e.g., Daniel Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic
Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 1012 (1998) (noting that the approach taken by
the Court before Crawford has tended to meld the Clause and the ordinary
hearsay doctrine).
225. See infra Part III.B.
226. See Friedman, supra note 224, at 1024.
227. Id. at 1014.
228. See id. (stating that the Confrontation Clause provides the defendant a
right to confront adverse witnesses-i.e., "those who make testimonial
statements").
229. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67 (2004).
230. Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation as a Hot Topic: The Virtues of
Going Back to Square One, 21 QLR 1041, 1042 (2003).
231. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 142 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Roberts test also failed to "protect against paradigmatic confrontation
violations,"232 permitting the admission of ex parte statements
prepared as testimony for trial when such statements fell within a
well-recognized hearsay exception or when the court determined that
they otherwise appeared reliable. 233 In other words, Roberts missed
the mark.
Crawford separated the Confrontation Clause analysis from
hearsay law, and as a result the Court arguably took a step closer to
securing the original principle that prompted the establishment of the
Confrontation Clause: prosecution witnesses must testify face-to-face
with the accused by requiring cross-examination of testimonial
hearsay evidence. 234  The Court's analysis provides, in theory, a
bright line rule: if testimonial, the accused must have the opportunity
for cross-examination.
The Crawford Court criticized Roberts for being too subjective
and for failing to provide a framework that secured the basic
principles the Sixth Amendment sought to protect. As the dissent
observed, however, Crawford's failure to provide sufficient guidance
in how to apply the new theory in practice "casts a mantle of
uncertainty over future criminal trials in both federal and state
courts." Accordingly, the new doctrine proposed in Crawford
could be subject to the same pitfalls as Roberts. If the category of
testimonial statements is too limited, the new doctrine might not be
any more favorable to the admissibility of hearsay than the reliability
structure in Roberts. Yet an expansive definition of "testimonial"
that includes statements beyond those the Sixth Amendment sought
to protect would unnecessarily subject the evidence to unwarranted
constitutional scrutiny. The possible implications of applying a
broad definition of "testimonial" require courts to read Crawford
carefully and consider the circumstances surrounding a proffered
statement.
236
232. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60; see id. at 62 ("Dispensing with confrontation
because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial
because a defendant is obviously guilty.").
233. See Lilly, 527 U.S. at 141 (Breyer, J., concurring).
234. See Friedman, supra note 230, at 1045.
235. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment but
dissenting from Court's decision to overrule Roberts).
236. Id. at 56 n.6. The Court refuses to generalize about all statements that
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With regard to the principal evils against which the Sixth
Amendment sought to protect, the Court in Crawford drew an
analogy between today's police interrogations and the sixteenth and
seventeenth century practice of pretrial examinations. 23 7 While the
resemblance between the two forms of evidence is reasonable, the
analogy should not be extended too far. Under a broad interpretation
of Crawford, the Sixth Amendment could bar critical evidence such
as a 911 call that conveys a victim's cry for help. In most instances a
911 call for help is "essentially different in nature' 238 than the
"principal evil at which the [Confrontation] Clause was directed" 239
and sought to exclude. Thus, Crawford must be confined to its
proper realm-protecting the defendant's right to confrontation with
respect to testimonial statements. Whether a particular statement is
testimonial cannot be determined by applying a per se rule. Rather,
whether a statement is testimonial must be determined by the facts
surrounding the proffered statement in each case.
Interpreting Crawford, lower courts have identified a number of
key factors for determining whether a statement is testimonial.
These include: who initiated the contact, whether the declarant made
the statement to a friend or family member as opposed to a police
officer or other government agent, whether the declarant was in
police custody at time he or she made the statement, and whether the
declarant reasonably thought that the statement would be used at
fall within the scope of the dying declaration exception. This refusal suggests
the Court contemplates that in classifying hearsay as testimonial or non-
testimonial, the trial judge should weigh the specific circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
Treatment of Prosecution Hearsay under Crawford v. Washington: Some Good
News, but .... , CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 16, 16-18.
237. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in England, Justices of
the Peace in felony cases would commonly examine witnesses and defendants
exparte prior to trial and use the examination as evidence at trial in lieu of live
testimony. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. The Court explains that police
interrogations are testimonial in nature because they bear a "striking
resemblance" to the pretrial examinations by English Justices of the Peace
against which the Confrontation Clause was directed. Id. at 52.
238. People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (Crim. Ct. 2004); see People
v. Caudillo, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574 (Ct. App. 2004); People v. Corella, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 770 (Ct. App. 2004); People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274, 276-77
(Sup. Ct. 2004).
239. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.
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trial.240 Even when the declarant makes a statement to a government
official, courts must consider whether the declarant made a statement
in response to "structured ' 24 1 questioning.242
Applying the new analysis on a case-by-case basis could lead to
inconsistent results depending on how a particular court frames its
inquiry. On their faces, the results of post-Crawford cases appear to
be contradictory. Certainly, some courts take a more expansive view
of Crawford than others, which arguably results in inconsistent
application of the rule.243 Yet the Crawford analysis is factually
determinative. Thus, apparently contradictory holdings may stem
from critical factual distinctions among the cases. For instance, in
People v. Cortes,244 the court barred the admission of a 911 tape that
described an ongoing shooting.245 The court found the contents of
the tape were testimonial in nature because the dispatcher elicited
detailed information from the caller regarding the event.2 46  In
People v. Moscat,247 however, the court found that a 911 call was not
testimonial and the evidence was admissible under the excited
utterance exception.
24 8
Despite these two apparently contradictory holdings, the two
cases are factually distinct. In Cortes, the call came from a witness
240. See, e.g., Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 879-80 (finding that a 911 call is not
testimonial in nature because it is the citizen who initiates the contact with
police and because the call is part of the event itself and, thus, not
contemplated as part of future legal proceedings).
241. See Crawford 541 U.S. at 53 n.4.
242. While the above factors provide guidance in determining whether a
statement is testimonial, they do not create a per se dividing line between
testimonial and non-testimonial statements. For further discussion on the
difficulties of developing such a dividing line, see Mosteller, supra note 65.
243. Compare People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Ct. App. 2004)
(applying a narrow view of testimonial, and holding that a victim's statements
to an officer at the hospital was not testimonial hearsay) with People v.
Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 758 (Ct. App. 2004) (employing a more
expansive view of Crawford and holding that a videotaped interview of a child
by a trained interviewer was inadmissible as testimonial hearsay because it was
"eminently reasonable to expect that the interview would be available for use
at trial").
244. 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
245. Id. at 407.
246. Id. at 404.
247. 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Crim. Ct. 2004).
248. See discussion infra accompanying notes 9-11.
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to a shooting,249 while in Moscat the court treated the call as from a
woman who feared for her life.25° She did not contact 911 to report a
crime. Rather, she sought help. The court in Cortes focused on the
fact that the purpose of the 911 call was to report a crime, while the
court in Moscat saw the 911 call as a call for help.251 The Moscat
court emphasized that 911 calls are generally made by a caller who
requires "protection from immediate danger." 25 2 Thus, under the
analysis in Moscat, a 911 call for help usually qualifies as an
"excited utterance" and is exempt from the hearsay rules because
very little time has passed between the incident and the call for
help.
253
Additionally, the court in Cortes reasoned that the method for
taking 911 calls fell within the definition of a "formal statement" or
an "interrogation," producing a statement that is testimonial evidence
and barred by the Sixth Amendment. 254 The court looked to the
dictionary definition of "interrogation" and reasoned that
"interrogate" means "to question" and "to examine by asking
questions." 255 Other state courts, however, have distinguished police
interrogations from police questioning.
256
The distinction between the sets of facts surrounding the 911
calls in the above cases illustrates why the determination of whether
a particular statement is testimonial must be decided on a case-by-
case basis. One could imagine a situation in which a 911 call lacked
249. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
250. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 879-80.
251. See Richard Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision
Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2004, at 4, 10
(noting that "[i]n some cases, the caller does not perceive that she is in
immediate danger, and the primary purpose of the call is ... to initiate
investigative and prosecutorial machinery").
252. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
253. Id. For more cases discussing the admissibility of 911 calls after
Crawford, see People v. Caudillo, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574, 582-90 (Ct. App.
2004); People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 774-79 (Ct. App. 2004); People
v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274, 276-77 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
254. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
255. Id. at 405 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1913)).
256. See, e.g., Hammon v. Indiana, 809 N.E.2d 945, 952 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004) (concluding that police "interrogation" is distinct from police
"questioning" and is much narrower in scope).
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trustworthiness-for instance, if the caller made a false accusation
out of revenge or anger. In such situations, the defendant would
argue she should have the chance to confront her accuser to ensure
the accuracy and trustworthiness of the allegation. On the other
hand, when the call occurs in the midst of violence or soon
thereafter, there is less concern about the trustworthiness of the
statement because the call generates from the "urgent desire of a
citizen to be rescued from immediate peril" rather than from the
desire of the prosecution or the police to seek evidence. 257 Further, if
little time has passed between the exciting event and the call for help,
the court should consider the call as an excited utterance because the
caller had no opportunity to reflect or falsify her account of the
event.
258
The apparent inconsistencies in the lower courts' decisions
confirm that that the exact parameters of what constitutes a
testimonial statement under Crawford are difficult to determine. The
new standard set forth in Crawford is factually determinative based
on the circumstances surrounding the proffered statement as well as a
particular court's interpretation of "testimonial."
The notion of a fact determinative, case-by-case analysis is not a
novel concept in criminal law. For instance, other areas of criminal
law where courts must make a fact based, case-by-case analysis
include the Fourth Amendment search and seizure issues259 and Fifth
Amendment Miranda warnings. 260  In each of these areas, the
257. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
258. See id. at 880.
259. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the use of bright-line rules
in Fourth Amendment analysis, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of
the reasonableness inquiry. See, e.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364,
366-367 (1964); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (explaining that no
bright-line rule of reasonableness exists under the Fourth Amendment, and
whether a search or seizure is unreasonable depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case); see also James Park, The Constitutional Tort
Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393, 439 (noting
that the reasonableness standard governing all Fourth Amendment claims is a
"fact-specific" inquiry).
260. See, e.g., Schnecklothe v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) ("In
determining whether a defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, the
Court has assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances-both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.").
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application of a bright-line rule would upset the balance of
constitutional protection.
While the proposed approach may leave prosecutors unable to
predict with any degree of certainty whether hearsay evidence will be
admissible at trial, the alternative of applying a generalized, broad
definition will extend the definition of testimonial to encompass
statements beyond the "principal evils" that the Sixth Amendment
sought to exclude.
Thus, until the Supreme Court describes more completely the
defining characteristics of testimonial statements and further clarifies
the scope of Crawford, lower courts must decide whether a particular
statement is testimonial on a case-by-case basis, looking to the
specific factors outlined in the Court's decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
Regardless of what constitutes a testimonial statement,
Crawford "radically transformed" the Confrontation Clause
doctrine.2 6 1  Only months after the Court decided Crawford,
hundreds of lower state and circuit courts around the country are
applying the Court's decision to numerous hearsay exceptions and
ultimately defining the reach of the new Confrontation Clause
doctrine. Although much of the Crawford opinion arguably supports
an expansive interpretation of testimonial, many courts have found
ways to circumvent the decision.
While the Court's new analysis represents a move closer to
restoring the basic principles that the Sixth Amendment sought to
protect, the impact of the opinion will differ greatly depending on
how courts ultimately define the term "testimonial." In light of the
potential impact Crawford could have on the exclusion of critical
evidence from criminal trials and the uncertainty of the boundaries
that constitute a testimonial statement, the decision must be confined
to protecting the defendant's right with respect to testimonial
statements. Accordingly, the lower courts are correct to define
261. Friedman, supra note 251, at 5.
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"testimonial" cautiously, focusing on the circumstances surrounding
the proffered statement in each case.
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